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YAMASHITA, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM:
COMMAND RESPONSmILITY REAPPRAISED
Franklin A. Hart
... if you were to apply to them
[General Westmoreland and other
U.S. generals] the same standards
that were applied to General
Yamashita, there would be a very
strong possibility that they would
come to the same end as he did. 1
The preceding assertion by Professor
Telford Taylor, the U.S. prosecutor at
Nuremberg after World War II, is a
benchmark in the current discussion of
war crimes and Vietnam. For the first
time, a reputable scholar of moderate
persuasion suggested the possibility that
American military leaders be tried for
their responsibilities in the conduct of
the Indochina war. Taylor's book
Nuremberg and Vietnam became an
instant success, and his analogy concern·
ing Yamashita is regularly cited in the
debate over the U.S. conduct of the

war. Variations of Taylor's Yamashita
analogy, often including the word
"Nuremberg," are freely bandied about
in the more important organs of the
American press. This publicity has con·
tributed to widespread belief that a
general principle of international law
concerning command responsibility was
established in the Yamashita case and
that application of the so-called Yama·
shita principle to the Vietnam war
wouid work to the detriment of U.S.
leaders.
The popular view of the Yamashita
case is well expressed in the following
passage from Taylor's book:
There was no charge that General
Yamashita had approved, much
less ordered these barbarities and
no evidence that he knew of them
other than the inference that he
must have because of their
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extent. ... Nevertheless, the tribunal found Yamashita guilty on
the ground that he had
" .... failed to provide effective
control of his troops as required
by the circumstances" and
sentenced him to death by hanging. 2
Unquestioningly accepting this perception of the Yamashita case, many
writers and commentators on the Vietnam war would then agree with Taylor's
conclusion quoted in the beginning of
this article that U.S. military leaders
would meet Yamashita's fate if subjected to the standards of his trial.
Most members of the press and the
academic community have adopted Taylor's thesis at face value without
examining it closely. None apparently
have wondered .why Nuremberg prosecutor Taylor, responsible for the trial
and imprisonment of a large number of
senior German military leaders, chose to
select as his standard and precedent the
result of an American Military Commission in the Far East that was not
conducted under international auspices.
The issues arising over "command
responsibility" as an international law
of war concept can be stated precisely.
The popular perception of the Yamashita principle is that it established a
rule that a military commander was
responsible for the breaches of law
committed by members of his command
whether or not he personally knew
about them. Yet, 2 and then 3 years
after the Yamashita case, international
military tribunals operating in a judicially restrained atmosphere at Nuremberg articulated a restricted standard of
command responsibility which required
that a military commander had to be
personally derelict to be found guilty. 3
Why has Nuremberg been ignored in the
headlines linking My Lai and Yamashita? Can Nuremberg and Yamashita be
reconciled?
This paper seeks to examine the
concept of cClmmand responsibility

formulated under the international law
of war. Command responsibility concerns the responsibility of a military
commander for the actions of his subordinates. Inherent in this discussion is
the development of this concept in the
Yamashita and Nuremberg trials and
then application of the internationally
recognized standard to U.S. conduct in
Vietnam.
A final preliminary point is that in
his recent book Professor Telford Taylor subsumed under the rubric of
"Yarnashita Case" an argument he had
put forward at the Nuremberg tribunals
more than two decades ago. His argument of absolute command responsibility was categorically and expressly
rejected in the Nuremberg "High Command Case.,,4 The Nuremberg section
of this study will document that result.
Recognition of Taylor's attempt to
resurrect a previously rejected argument
is important because it indicates the
confusion and misunderstandings extant
in the field of command responsibility.
At a time when men's lives and
reputations are at stake, it is distressing
to read as great a denial of legal craftsmanship and law as has been evidenced
in Professor Taylor's comment in the
introduction to Nuremberg and Vietnam:
For these purposes, the term
"Nuremberg Trials" should not be
taken as limi ted to the precise
rulings of the Nuremberg courts,
but in its broad sense, as standing
for all the war crimes trials that
followed in the wake of the
Second World War, and the ideas
they have generated. Today
"Nuremberg" is both what actually happened there and what
people think happened, and the
second is more important than the
first. To set the record straight, is,
no doubt a useful historical exercise, but sea change is itself a
reality, and it is not the bare
record but the ethos of Nurem-

399
berg with which we must reckon
today.
Put another way, Nuremberg is
not only what was said and done
there, but also what was said
about it, then and subsequently ... 5
As a constitutional lawyer, Professor
Taylor knows that such attacks as his
must be clearly written. Surely it is a
very questionable practice to establish
public emotion, rather than precisely
reasoned judgments, as formulating the
rules of human behavior.
Yamashita Case. On 7 December
1945, an American Military Commission
of five general officers, sitting in Manila,
Philippine Islands, found Gen. Tomayuki Yamashita, Commanding General
of the Japanese 14th Army Group in
the Philippines, guilty of failing to
discharge his duty by permitting the
members of his command to commit
atrocities against Americans and Filipinos in the Philippine Islands during
the period 9 October 1944 to 2 September 1945 and sentenced him to hang.
After ultimate recourse to the Supreme
Court of the United States, Yamashita
was hanged on 23 February 1946. 6
The evidence presented to the Military Commission indicated that a significant number of atrocities were committed by members of the Japanese
military within a short time interval and
under similar circumstances during the
dates specified. The 123 specific charges
alleged a total of tens of thousands of
deaths.7 General Yamashita contended
that most of the atrocities were committed by units or commanders distant
from his headquarters, either geographically or in the chain of command, and
that he had no knowledge of the atrocities. In its judgment, the Commission
accepted certain of the geographical and
communications difficulties alleged by
the Japanese general but concluded that
these problems were not quite as insurmountable aSI Yamashita contended. 8

The prosecution built its case upon
proving to the Commission that the
atrocities had indeed been committed
and identifying the perpetrators as individuals or units ultimately subordinate
to General Yamashita. 9 The core of the
prosecution's contention is contained in
the following assertion by the chief
prosecutor:
The record itself strongly supports
the contention or conclusion that
Yamashita not only permitted but
ordered the commission of these
atrocities. However, our case does
not depend upon any direct
orders from the accused. It is
sufficient that we show that the
accused "permitted" these atrocities. ... Who permitted them?
Obviously the man whose duty it
was to prevent such an orgy of
planned and obviously deliberate
murder, rape and arson-the commander of those troops! 1 0
Perhaps concerned that the Military
Commission would not accept this
theory and would require proof of
Yamashita's personal involvement, the
prosecutor went beyond his stated plan
and introduced evidence directly linking
Yamashita to the atrocities. 11
The judgment of the Military Commission appeared to support the prosecutor's contentio"n. The frequently cited
part of the judgment which established
for legal onlookers the principles under
which Yamashita was found guilty reads
as follows:
Clearly, assignment to command
military troops is accompanied by
broad authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true in all
armies throughout recorded history. It is absurd, however, to
consider a commander a murderer
or rapist because one of his
soldiers commits a murder or a
rape. Nonetheless, if murder and
rape and vicious, revengeful
actions are widespread offenses
and there is no effective attempt
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by a commander to discover and
control the criminal acts, such a
commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for
the lawless acts of his troops,
depending upon their nature and
the circumstances surrounding
them .... 12
With this statement of principles, the
Military Commission then went on to
declare to General Yamashita, u • • • that
during the period in question you failed
to provide effective control of your
troops as required by the circum·
stances."
Since this key part of the judgment
did not address the question of actual
knowledge on General Yamashita's part
and because the evidence linking Yamashita to the atrocities has been portrayed as weak, most legal scholars
concluded that Yamashita's guilt was
based upon his commanding a unit
engaged in such widespread atrocities
that he should be held responsible for
them. It is not clear, however, whether
ascription arises from imputation of a
constructive knowledge or from a legal
concept of absolute responsibility.
In reviewing the Military Commission's judgment, we find that the U.S.
generals were impressed by the scope of
the atrocities and hence believed that
General Yamashita should have known
about them or did know and lied about
his knowledge. The difference between
the two propositions is significant because upon it hinges the question as to
whether or not personal guilt must be
proved. Unfortunately, the Commission's judgment failed to discuss explicitly whether it accepted or rejected
Yamashita's contention of ignorance.
Because of their perception of an
absence of credible evidence linking the
Japanese general to the proven atrocities, international legal scholars and
others have usually asserted that the
Commission accepted Yamashita's statement of ignorance. Yet it is equally as
credible to assE1rt that the Commission

believed Yamashita lied as to believe
that it accepted his word.
If we reexamine the judgment we can
find sections in which the Military
Commission exhibited disbelief at what
Yamashita told them and seemed convinced that he ordered or knowlingly
permi tted the atrocities. Consider this
part of the judgment:
The prosecution presented evidence to show that the crimes
were so extensive and widespread,
both as to time and area, that
they must either have been wilfully permitted by the accused, or
secretly ordered by the accused.
Captured orders issued by subordinate officers of the accused
were presented as proof that they,
at least, ordered certain acts leading directly to exterminations of
civilians under the guise of eliminating guerrillas hostile to
Japan. 13
The Commission's comments concerning Yamashita's method of operation displayed considerable incredulity.
The Japanese Commanders testified that they did not make personal inspections or independent
checks during the Philippine campaign to determine for themselves
the established procedures by
which their subordinates accomplished their missions. Taken at
full face value, the testimony indicates that Japanese senior commanders operate in a vacuum,
almost in another world with
respect to their troops, compared
with standards American generals
take for granted. 14
The quoted sections of the judgment
resulted from the extensive evidence
introduced by the prosecution which
purported to show that Yamashita knew
of the atrocities, ordered some of them,
and was headquarterd so close to several
of the scenes of infamy that he could
not have failed to notice them. Nothing
in the questioning by the Military
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Commission or in its judgment provides
a basis to believe that the generals did
not accept this evidence. The evidence
linking Yamashita to the atrocities, al·
though often hearsay, was quite spe·
cific. IS When one combines the quantity of such evidence with the judgment,
it becomes difficult to believe that the
Military Commission accepted Yamashita's protestations of ignorance.
The contention that the Military
Commission rejected Yamashita's plea
of ignorance is strengthened by paragraphs below which describe how a
Board of Review of Army officers in the
Pacific informed Gen. Douglas MacArthur that Yamashita's testimony
could not be believed
The review conducted by General
MacArthur is an important and previously unpublished part of the Yamashita proceedings. MacArthur's confirmation of the sentence of hanging
followed his receipt of a written review
which asserted that Yamashita had lied.
The Board of Review of five military
lawyers, headed by Col. C.M. Ollivetti,
the Theater Judge Advocate, prepared a
detailed analysis of the record of trial
for MacArthur. I 6
First, the review presented evidence
of a deliberate Japanese plan of extermination:
The following evidence indicates a
deliberate plan of extermination:
most of the atrocities were committed during a short period in
February, 1945 ... and were carried on under the supervision of
Japanese officers ... following
the same procedure of concentrating the population of a town
or barrio at a convenient place
and killing them in an orderly
manner. ... the large scale upon
which attempts were made to
exterminate the male popUlation
of some places ... and the
wanton killing of women and children ... indicates an intention to
wipe OUtl the people of the

province. The deliberate destruction of whole towns and barrios
was also a part of this plan ... I 7
In short, the Board of Review perceived
a conspiracy to commit genocide directed or abetted by Yamashita.
Second, the Board took special note
of evidence which connected General
Yamashita with actual knowledge of the
atrocities perpetrated. Telford Taylor,
who wrote that there was "no evidence
that he [Yamashita] knew of them [the
atrocities] other than the inference that
he must have because of their extent" I 8
should be surprised at the amount of
evidence presented to the Commission
which indicated knowledge. I 9 Admittedly, the evidence linking Yama·
shita to the crimes included a number of
instances of hearsay evidence and conjecture. What is important is that the
Board of Review apparently believed it
and described it to General MacArthur
without cautioning him as to its legal
validity. 2 0
Third, the Board of Review reo
affirmed the validity of the concept of
command responsibility without addressing the subject of explicit knowledge raised by the defense.
But since the duty rests on a
commander to protect by any
means in his power both the civil
population and the prisoners of
war from wrongful acts of his
command and since the failure to
discharge that duty is a violation
of the Laws of War, there is no
reason, either in law or morality,
why he should not be held criminally responsible for permitting
such violations by his subordinates, even though that action has
heretofore seldom or never been
taken. The responsibility of the
commander to control his troops
is well understood by all experienced military men, including
accused ... 21
Specific aspects of this command
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responsibility doctrine were discussed in
the review when it faulted the accused:
Although the attitude of the Filipino civilians was one of increasing hostility, he did not, though in
violation of duty investigate their
conditions at any time nor did he
ever inspect prisoner of war or
civilian internment camps, even
though one was located at his
headquarters ... At no time did
he order, receive any report or
acquire any knowledge whatever
of any mistreatment or killing of
civilians, American prisoners of
war or civilian internees by the
military police or any of his subordinates. 22
Fourth, the disbelief in Yamashita's
contention that he knew nothing of the
atrocities, the. Review Board's belief in
the extermination plan thesis, and the
credence given the evidence linking
Yamashita to the crimes are brought
together in the summary section of the
review:
The only real question in the case
concerns accused's responsibility
for the atrocities shown to have
been committed by members of
his command. Upon this issue a
careful reading of all the evidence
impels the conclusion that it
demonstrates this responsibility.
In the first place the atrocities
were so numerous, involved so
many people, and were so widespread that accused's professed
ignorance is incredible. Then, too,
their manner of commission reveals a striking similarity of pattern throughout ... in several instances there was direct proof of
statements by the Japanese participants that they were acting
pursuant to orders of higher authorities, in a few cases Yamashita
himself being mentioned as the
source of the order.... All this
leads to the inevitable conclusion
that the atrocities were not the

sporadic acts of soldiers out of
control but were carried out pursuant to a deliberate plan of mass
extermination which must have
emanated from higher authority
or at least had its approval ....
From the widespread character of
the atrocities as above outlined,
the orderliness of their execution
and the proof that they were done
pursuant to orders, the conclusion
is inevitable that the accused
knew about them and either gave
his tacit approval to them or at
least failed to do anything either
to prevent them or to punish their
perpetrators.
There was some evidence in the
record tending to connect accused
even more directly with the commission of some of the atrocities ... , While, however, it may be
conceded that the accused was
operating under some difficulty
due to the rapidity of the advance
of the Americans, there was substantial evidence in the record
that the situation was not so bad
as stated by the accused .... 23
After the findings and sentence were
confirmed by General MacArthur, the
defense appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Without examining
the substantive evidence introduced in
the trial at Manila, the Supreme Court
ruled that the offense of which General
Yamashita was charged constituted a
violation of the laws of war:
The question then is whether the
law of war imposes on an army
commander a duty to take such
appropriate measures as are within
his power to control the troops
under his command for the preventipn of the specified acts
which are violations of the law of
war and which are likcly to attcnd
the occupation of hostile territory
by an uncontrolled soldiery, and
whether he may be charged with
personal responsibility for his
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failure to take such measures
when violations result. That this
was the precise issue to be tried
was made clear by the statement
of the prosecution at the opening
of the trial.
It is evident that the conduct
of military operations by troops
whose excesses are unrestrained
by the orders or efforts of their
commander would almost certainly result in violations which it
is the purpose of the law of war to
prevent ....
These provisions plainly imposed
on petitioner ... an affirmative
duty to take such measures as
were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to
protect prisoners of war and the
ci·'ilian PQPulation?4
In order 'to reinforce the point that
the Court was not examining the evidence with respect to the critical question of responsibility described above,
the Court first said, "We do not here
appraise the evidence on which petitioner was convicted," and then in a
footnote to the same paragraph reiterated, "We do not weigh the evidence. We merely held that the charge
sufficiently states a violation against the
law of war .... 25
Those who read the Supreme Court's
decision and were disappointed with its
ambiguous nature and its failure to
discuss certain questions raised by the
defense should not be surprised to find
the ambiguity deliberate. In a letter to
the legal historian John P. Frank less
than 1 month after the decision, Associate Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge related that the argument over the
Yamashita case and its constitutional
implications was bitter and deep. Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone deliberately
omitted whole sections of constitutional
argument from the majority opinion
because of an inability of the majority
to agree on its rationale. 2 6
'rhe bitte~ dissents of Justices Rut-

ledge and Frank Murphy raised severe
questions about the fairness of the trial
as well as the judicial principles asserted.
Murphy and Rutledge questioned the
rules of evidence which varied considerably from those used at the time in
U.S. courts-martials, the haste of the
trial, denial of fifth amendment rights
to the accused, and the appropriateness
of the charge? 7 In describing the
process Murphy charged that:
The trial proceeded with great
dispatch without allowing the defense time to prepare an adequate
case. Petitioner's rights under due
process clause of the Fifth
Amendment were grossly and
openly violated without any justification. All of this was done
without any thorough investigation and prosecution of those
immediately responsible for the
atrocities, out of which might
have come some proof or indication of personal culpability on
petitioner's part. 2 8
Associate Justice Rutledge attacked the
fairness of the trial with equal fervor:
One basic protection of our system and one only, petitioner has
had. He has been represented by
able counsel, officers of the army
he fought .... But, as will appear,
even this conceded shield was
taken away in much of its value,
by denial of reasonable opportunity for them to perform their
functions. 29
In referring to the last minute addition of a Supplemental Bill of Particulars alleging 59 additional offenses and
the denial of additional time for the
defense to prepare their case, Rutledge
caustically added: " ... this wide departure from the most elementary principles of fairness vitiated the proceedings. When added to the other denials of
fundamental right sketched above, it
deprived the proceedings of any semblance of trial as we know that institution.,,30
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To those who would charge unfairness on the basis of the comments
above, we would respond that the
Supreme Court in its review of the case
sustained the proceedings. Although the
majority ruled neither on the substance
of the evidence nor the question of
fairness per se, they held that the
offense charged was a violation of the
laws of war and that the safeguards of
the fifth amendment and the requirements of the Articles of War were not
applicable to a prisoner of war charged
with war crimes committed prior to his
capture. 3 1 Put squarely, unfairness was
upheld.
At this point we should question
why legal scholars have asserted that
there was "no evidence that he [Yamashita] knew of" the atrocities. 3 2 The
answer appeal\S straightforward- The
Military Commission failed to address
the question of knowledge explicitly,
and the report of the Board of Review
was not published. No observer knew
what the generals and the various reviewing authorities really believed. This
vacuum of understanding was quickly
preempted by a very aggressive defense
team and one of its members in particular, A.. Frank Reel. In the trial at Manila,
the hearing before the U.S. Supreme
Court in Washington, and the campaign
waged in the press both before and after
Yamashita's execution, Reel and his
comrades leaned heavily on a line of
defense which asserted a lack of credible
evidence linking Yamashita to the
atrocities. These assertions were repeated so often that they became accepted as facts. Associate Justices
Murphy and Rutledge incorporated
Reel's contentions concerning lack of
credible evidence in their sharp dissents
and commented on the Government's
failure to refute them. 3 3
After the trial Reel wrote an interesting account of the Yamashita pro·
ceedings which received widespread
publicity and is often used as a repository of facts about the trial. 34 In his

account Reel proved to his own satisfaction that any evidence which linked
Yamashita to the crimes should not
have been admitted or was discredited
when introduced. Subsequent discussions of the trial have for the most part
accepted Reel's vit::ws as stated by him
and by the two dissenting Supreme
Court Justices. 3 5
Rutledge's and Murphy's views concerning the fairness of the trial, their
views on the lack of evidence linking
Yamashita to the crimes, and Reel's
unchallenged declarations have colored
the popular view of the Yamashita trial.
It would be well for us to remember
that substantial evidence was introduced
which directly linked Yamashita to the
crimes. In one instance his own Judge
Advocate testified that he had received
personal permission from Yamashita to
allow the Japanese military police to
punish captured Filipino guerrillas without trial. 3 6 The charge that such evidence could not have been admissible in
a U.S. court is irrelevant to our understanding of the meaning of the Yamashita verdict. More importantly, the
Supreme Court declined to review the
evidentiary rules, and the Military Commission heard evidence under these rules
which tended to show General Yamashita knew of the crimes. Hence, the
conviction reflected an example of
command responsibility in which a commander was convicted for crimes committed by his forces about which he
knew and failed to take action or may
even have directed.
What then should we make of the
Yamashita case? Telford Taylor'S thesis
that war crimes trials are what people
think happened proves most valid in this
trial. Evidence exists to support the
belief that both the members of the
Military Commission and the Reviewing
Authority (General MacArthur) believed
that Yamashita knew of the atrocities
committed by his forces and either
ordered them or, at minimum, knowingly permitted them. Hence the ver-
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dict was consistent with the accepted
principle of the international law of war
that a commander is responsible for
those actions which he directed or
sanctiolled. However, a combination of
circumstances established in the Yamashita case a perception of a principle of
absolute responsibility. The factors leading to this misperception were: lack of
information as to whether or not the
Military Commission believed Yamashita; lack of information concerning
the basis upon which General MacArthur sustained the conviction and
sentence; the ambiguity of certain portions of the Military Commission's judgment; the hearsay nature of the evidence which linked Yamashita to the
atrocities; and the manner in which the
defense counsel and the dissenting
Supreme Coutt Justices couched the
central issue. The defense counsel, the
Supreme Court Justices, and legal
scholars appeared to believe that the
Military Commission accepted Yamashita's protestations of ignorance at face
value and convicted him in spite of
them. Justice Frank Murphy's description of the action taken against Yamashita, unchallenged in the majority
opinion, reflects the view held su bsequently by most students of internationallaw:
He [Yamashita] was not charged
with personally participating in
acts of atrocity or with ordering
or condoning their commission.
Not even knowledge of these
crimes was attributed to him. It
was simply alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as commander
to control the operations of members of his command, permi tting
them to commit the acts of
atrocity.37
Legal scholars have subsequently accepted the so·called Yamashita principle
as Justice Murphy stated it without
reconciling it to later trials at Nuremberg or elsewhere.

It should be apparent from the evidence presented that the public perception of a Yamashita principle of absolute command responsibility should be
rejected and its use discredited. Contrary to popular belief, substantial evidence was introduced in the trial linking
Yamashita to the crimes for which he
was charged. Although the evidence
might be inadmissible by today's standards, the Supreme Court declined to
review the evidentiary rules and thus
allowed them to stand. More importantly, the Military Commission accepted the evidence as presented; the
judgment gives no reason to believe
otherwise. Further, the Board of Review
left little doubt that it believed General
Yamashita knew of the offenses and
hence was guilty under established international law. Thus, the generals who sat
in judgment convicted a military commander whose troops committed war
crimes and who learned about the
atrocities and took no punitive or preventive action. This result clearly conflicts with the various reports of the
Yamashita case which usually assert that
no credible evidence was found to link
the Japanese general with the offenses
and then announce a principle based
upon that assertion.
The next section of. this paper will
. examine the Nuremberg Subsequent
Proceedings which provide a precise and
reasonable articulation of command
responsibility rendered in an acceptable
judicial environment.
The Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings. The principle of limited command
responsibility articulated at Nuremberg
is consistent with the command responsibility doctrine cited in the Yamashita
case. It is no accident that Telford
Taylor selected the word "Nuremberg"
for use in the title of a book concerning
principles derived from all war crimes
trials following the Second World War.
To the American public Nuremberg is
both synonymous with war crimes trials
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and perceived as the accepted standard
of such trials. Additionally, the conduct
of the trials at Nuremberg evoked less
criticism of their fairness and received
far more praise for their judicial restraint than did certain of the U.S.
Military Commissions in the Far East or
the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East. 3 8
Two types of trials were conducted
at Nuremberg. During 1945-1946 the
In ternational Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg tried the major war criminals including Goering, Hess, Keitel,
Speer, and others. Upon completion of
this tribunal, the United States, under
international auspices, conducted the
Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings;
these consisted of 12 trials against major
groups of German leaders, including
government ministers, justices, diplomats, and others. Two cases against
military leaders have relevance for the
study of "Command Responsibility":
Case No.7, U.S. v. List et. al., "The
Hostages case"; and Case No. 12, U.S. v.
von Leeb et. al., "The High Command
case."
"The High Command case" concerned the trial of 14 German Army,
Navy, and Air Force leaders for plotting
aggressive war and implementing illegal
orders such as the "Commissar Order,"
the "Barbarossa Order," the "Commando Order," and the "Night and Fog
Decree." Most of the alleged offenses
occurred on the Russian front. 3 9
The most prominent defendant in
"The High Command case" was Field
Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, who commanded, among other units, Army
Group North on the Russian front from
June 1941 to January 1942. Von Leeb
was charged with war crimes and crimes
against humanity through the commission of crimes against enemy belligerents and prisoners of war. Specifically,
the Chief Counsel of War Crimes, Brig.
Gen. Telford Taylor, charged that Von
Leeb: implemented the "Commissar
Order" callil}g for the immediate execu-

tion of Soviet political officers captured
by German forces; implemented the
"Barbarossa" jurisdictional order which
called for the execution of captured
Russian partisans; and condoned crimes
against civilians through the activities of
the Einsatzgruppes which operated in
the Army Group rear area and were
responsible for the execution of thousands of civilians.4 0
Von Leeb put forward a vigorous
defense. First, he asserted that he had
opposed illegal orders such as the "Commissar Order" and had not disseminated
them. Second, he maintained that he
had received no reports of executions of
Russian soldiers or civilians and that he
was unaware of the operations of the
Einsatzgruppes, although credible evidence proved that their activities were
widespread and notorious. 4 1
In effect, Von Leeb presented a
defense that had many elements in
common with that of General Yamashita. How was it received? The prosecution's closing arguments in the Von
Leeb case were reminiscent of the prosecution arguments at Manila in the fall of
1945. In respect to Von Leeb himself,
the prosecution, under Taylor's direction, charged:
The prosecution suggests that
these so-called "defenses" are
miserable fabrications, and that
the record proves incontrovertibly
that the Commissar Order was
distributed and carried out within
von Leeb's Army Group, with von
Leeb's knowledge and resulted in
the outright murder of numerous
prisoners of war . . .. Whether von
Leeb himself passed the order to
the Fiftieth Corps, or whether,
knowing that the Sixteenth Army
would pass the orders to them, he
took no action to prevent this,
seems to the prosecution a totally
academic question .... von Leeb's
testimony that he did not learn of
the reports concerning the shoot-
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ings of commissars pursuant to
the order is totally incredible. 42
In its judgment the tribunal examined closely the evidence directly
linking Von Leeb with crimes against
enemy belligerents or prisoners of war
and found him not guilty of executing
Red army soldiers within his area, not
guilty of the murder or slave labor
recruitment of civilians in his area, not
guilty of the pillage of public and
private property, and not guilty of
criminal conduct in the siege of Leningrad. What is signficant about this finding is that Von Leeb was found not
guilty of the first two charges even
though credible evidence was presented
that such criminal activities occurred
within his Army Group area. The court
found Von Leeb guilty of implementing
the "Barbarossa" jurisdiction order
which specifie~ execution for certain
types of Russian guerrillas captured. He
was sentenced to 3 years in prison, given
credit for pretrial confinement, and
released at the end of the trial. 4 3
In its judgment rendered on Von
Leeb and his codefendants, the court
dealt rather specifically with the subject
of command responsibility:
Modern war such as the last war
entails a large measure of decentralization. A high commander
cannot keep completely informed
of the details of military operations of subordinates and most
assuredly not of every administrative measure. He has the right to
assume that details entrusted to
responsible subordinates will be
legally executed. The President of
the United States is Commander
in Chief of its military forces.
Criminal acts committed by those
forces cannot in themselves be
charged to him on the theory of
subordination. The same is true of
other high commanders in the
chain of command. Criminality
does not attach to every individual in this phain of command

from that fact alone. There must
be a personal dereliction. That can
occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or where
his failure to properly supervise
his subordinates constitutes
criminal negligence on his part. In
the latter case it must be a personal neglect amounting to a
wanton, immoral disregard of the
action of his subordinates
amounting to acquiescence. 4 4
Later the tribunal stated explicitly
that, " ... the commander must have
knowledge of these offenses and acquisesce or participate or criminally
neglect to interfere in their commission
and that the offenses must be patently
criminal. ,,4 5
In dealing with its judgment on Von
Leeb, the tribunal categorically rejected
the prosecution's arguments and said:
The evidence suggests that criminal orders were executed by units
subordinate to the defendant and
criminal acts were carried out by
agencies under his command. But
it is not considered under the
situation outlined that criminal
responsibility attaches to him
merely on the theory of su bordination and overall command. He
must be shown both to have had
knowledge and to have been connected with such criminal acts
either by way of participation or
criminal acquiescence. 4 6
Additionally, the court further stated
in another part of the Von Leeb judgment:
While he [von Leeb] had the right
to issue orders to his subordinates
concerning such matters, he also
had the right to assume that the
officers in command of those
units would properly perform the
function which had been entrusted to them by higher authorities, both as to the proper care of
prisoners of war or the uses to
which they might be put. 47
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The cases of Von Leeb's codefendants are not of concern here since
those who were found guilty of crimes
against enemy belligerents or prisoners
of war faced overwhelming evidence
which linked them to both knowledge
and direction of such crimes. No real
doubt exists that a commander who
directs illegal acts against civilians or
prisoners of war or who knows of such
acts by troops under his command and
fails to take proper action bears criminal
responsibility .
A second Nuremberg trial which
offers insights into the issue of command responsibility was the trial of
Wilhelm List and others, commonly
known as the "Hostages Case." Field
Marshal Wilhelm List and 11 other
German officers were brought to trial
during the Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings on the charge that they had
committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The charges reflected
the cruel and bloody reprisals, including
the shooting of hostages, that the German generals had inflicted on the populations of Greece, Yugoslavia, and
Albania. All but two of the defendants
were found guilty in varying degrees. 48
The case affirmed the principle of
the responsibility of the commander for
the actions of his forces. On the other
hand, specific evidence was introduced
linking knowledge of the atrocities, as
well as direction in some instances, to
the defendants. Defendants in this case
were unable to prove ignorance since
lesser officials regularly reported all
reprisals to the senior commanders.
Several of the defendants were found
not guilty of implementing the "Commissar . Order" within their units although cases of its implementation were
proven. The prosecution lost on such
charges when it was unable to link the
defendants with direct knowledge of the
crimes. 49
The implications of the Nuremberg
Subsequent Proceedings for the issue of

command responsibility are impressive.
In a series of trials conducted under
international auspices, panels of U.S.
civilian judges, operating in a more
judicial atmosphere than that which
prevailed in Manila in 1945, rejected the
doctrine of absolute command responsibility apparently established in the
Yamashita case and established more
limited and reasonable standards concerning a commander's responsibility
for the actions of his command. The
negligence of the commander had to be
"personal." Knowledge of the crime had
to be shown. The civilian judges at
Nuremberg seemed better able than the
generals at Manila to acknowledge the
difficulties of discipline in unusual situations, the reliance of a commander on
his subordinates, and the breadth and
scope of activities under the control of
senior military commanders.
Vietnam. Telford Taylor's allegations
against General Westmoreland and other
U.S. military commanders are based
upon the underlying assumption that
war crimes committed by U.S. forces
have been so numerous that U.S. military leaders should have known of them
and hence prevented them. This allegation has been stated more explicitly by
others.s 0
How can the U.S. military leaders
reply? This is a question which every
military professional must be able to
discuss. A reply to this question might
proceed on two different planes. First,
the number of criminal or unlawful acts
committed by U.S. forces would not
seem as widespread to a U.S. general as
they would to a Telford Taylor or a
Richard Falk because many of the acts
considered unlawful by Taylor or Falk
might be considered legal under international law. Second, U.S. military leaders
could establish a vigorous affirmative
defense through demonstration of the
command policies, command briefings,
individual briefings, and punishments
rendered against perpetuators of unlaw-
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ful acts. Each of the two planes will be
briefly presented.
What are the unlllwful acts charged
against the United States? The charges
include: excessive use of aerial and
artillery firepower resulting in the unnecessary death of civilians, unlawful
relocation pf South Vietnamese civilians, wanton destruction of property,
and torture and murder of prisoners of
war. 51
The first line of defense of a U.S.
military leader against charges of widespread criminal activity in Vietnam is to
assert that many of the acts branded
unlawful by the "war crimes publicists"
are acts which are legally defensible
under the U.S. Government's interpretation of the international law of war.
What is not understood by most of the
pu blic and is ~gnored by many of the
military's detractors is that the number
of criminal acts committed by U.S.
forces is a function of how one addresses four specific issues: the international legality of the U.S. presence in
Vietnam, the independence of the
Saigon regime, the intent of the U.S.
military commanders in implementing
certain courses of strategy and tactics,
and the reasonableness of the reply to a
charge of conducting certain "unlawful
acts" that the acts were indeed lawful.
Telford Taylor acknowledged part of
this matrix of issues in Nuremberg and
Vietnam. 52
The legality of the American presence and the independence of the Saigon' regime place the legal relationship
of the U.S. forces to the South Vietnamese citizens on a considerably different basis than that which would
obtain if the U.S. forces were occupying
South Vietnam following an invasion.
The position that the U.S. Government
can offer on this issue is at least as
strong as the position of the Government's detractors. Persuasive briefs
which a reasonable man should find
believable hav~ been written supporting

the U.S. position. 5 3 Acceptance of the
reasonableness of the legality of the
U.S. intervention and the independence
of the Saigon regime strengthens considerably the already strong legal defense of civilian relocation, for example.
The citizens of a cobelligerent do not
enjoy the same protections from their
allies that the civilians of an occupied
nation should expect from the occupier.
A country's power to relocate its inhabitants in order to prosecute a war is
virtually unlimited. 54 The lack of
clamor concerning extensive relocation
activities in Kenya and Malaya is mute
evidence of international acceptance of
such practices. One has to recognize
only that the United States has a reasonable legal defense of its intervention,
without accepting that defense, in order
to undercut certain of the war crimes
charges. Relocation activities may also
be defended by recourse to the "Hostages case" at Nuremberg wherein the
tribunal declared that the inhabitants of
occupied territories may be relocated in
order to prosecute antiguerrilla campaignS.55
Intent is perhaps the major consideration in the question of the use of
airpower and artillery. If the United
States intended to use air and artillery
to terrorize the peasantry or for reprisals, as Neil Sheehan charges, then
such use would probably be illegal. 56
On the other hand, a military commander may legally employ air and
artillery firepower against a populated
area from which he is receiving fire or
which is offering armed resistance. 57 It
is unfortunate but not illegal if the
commander unintentionally erred in his
judgment about the size of the force he
faced and caused excessive civilian
casualties. Precise estimates of enemy
strength are extraordinarily difficult in
fighting guerrillas in or near villages.
Two snipers armed with Russian AK47
automatic rifles can sound like a
platoon, thereby causing an opposing
pIa toon commander to decide he needs
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fire support to neutralize the enemy
opposition.
The natural tendency of battlefield
commanders is to take steps to avoid
excessive casualties to their own units
through the employment of all firepower means available to them. Admittedly, such practices can produce
counterproductive results in guerrilla
wars, but it is international legality and
not effectiveness of counterinsurgency
practices with which we are concerned.
This tendency to minimize battlefield
casualties results, to some extent, from
the responsibility felt by American
leaders to account to the American
public for the lives of their sons. Lest
anyone assert that manifestations of this
tendency in Vietnam are evidence of
racist attitudes toward "inferior
peoples," on$ need only recollect the
extravagant artillery and tactical airpower the United States employed
against the Germans in Western Europe
in 1944-1945.
In their concern with civilian casualties, the media representatives have lost
sight of the fact that international law
provides only the most rudimentary
protections to civilians caught in the
midst of combat operations. Although
civilians enjoy an immunity from direct
attack, it is not an absolute immunity.
The law of war acknowledges that the
killing and wounding of civilians is often
an incidental aspect of the lawful conduct of military operations. Incidental
injury to civilians is not unlawful so
long as it does not violate a mandatory
rule of the law of war, is justified by the
rule of necessity, and the suffering
caused is not disproportionate to the
military advantage gained. 5 8 Even the
more recent Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the
Civilian Population in Time of War
specifically recognize the limited nature
of the immunity enjoyed by the civilian
population. 5 9 As Telford Taylor puts it,
"The death of an infant in consequence
of military .operations ... does not

establish that a war crime has been
commi tted. ,,6 0
The important point is that an informed and objective observer, viewing
the battlefield, would not perceive as
many unlawful acts as Richard Falk
might see. The informed and objective
observer would understand the intent
behind many of the actions that others
might consider unlawful and the specific
context within which they occurred.
Hence, it is a Procrustean feat to charge
that the military leaders are guilty of
war crimes because so many war crimes
took place that they must have known
of them and perhaps ordered them.
Battlefield actions which in Richard
Falk's view are criminal may seem lawful and necessary, even if tragic, to the
knowledgeable officer.
.
It must be noted that the previously
described defense of the military is
asserted only within an admittedly narrow framework of international law
since it is within this framework that
the military's critics purport to operate
as they accuse the United States of war
crimes. The paper does not attempt to
reply on the more transcendent moral
plane.
The second part of the reply of the
American military leader to the charge
of war crimes would be to assert the
number of actions taken to prevent war
crimes. General Westmoreland, General
Abrams, and the entire military chain of
command can establish an active defense by demonstrating the steps taken
in war crimes prevention-a case which
none of the German or Japanese generals could argue. Space limitations preclude full development of the U.S.
defense, but the outline will be
sketched. The Vietnam participant can
expand this from his own experience.
From the early days of the buildup
of U.S. ground forces, the J\merican
command in Saigon took strong, active
steps to minimize civilian casualties. The
command action proceeded along three
dimensions; (1) command policies
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passed through the chain of command,
(2) briefings for the individual soldier,
and (3) investigation of apparent unlawful acts and punishment of perpetrators.
Perusal of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) files indicates
that minimization of civilian casualties,
treatment of enemy prisoners, and the
rules of engagement which govern firepower use were major concerns of the
U.S. commander. The records of the
commanders' conferences held by General Westmoreland contain periodic
warnings to this effect. 6 1 The policies
and rules of engagement have been
declared "virtually impeccable" even by
Telford Taylor62 and were eulogized by
a representative of the International
Committee of the Red Cross who pronounced the MACV policy for the
handling of POW's, " ... a brilliant expression of a liberal and realistic attitude.,,63 Commanders' conferences
down to division level usually included
similar admonitions concerning civilian
casualties, handling of POW's, and the
rules of engagement.
A second aspect of U.S. policy concerns the briefs received by individual
soldiers. Each soldier arriving in Vietnam received from his unit a briefing
concerning the rules of engagement,
attitudes toward civilians, and the
handling of prisoners of war. More
importantly, he was issued two small
wallet-sized cards called, "Nine Rules"
and "The Enemy in Your Hands." The
"Nine Rules" stressed the necessity to
maintain a humane attitude toward the
Vietnamese people. "The Enemy in
Your Hands" reiterated in simplified
terms the provisions of the Geneva
Convention concerning the handling of
prisoners of war. Many commanders of
combat units regularly inspected their
commands to ensure retention of these
cards.
Finally, one must take note of the
punitive aspects of U.S. policy. MACV's
policy required investigation of all allegations of uljllawful acts and courts-

martial where appropriate. During the
period 1965 to 1971, investigated allegations of war crimes or of offenses of
violence against Vietnamese nationals
resulted in the conviction of 176 U.S.
Army personnel and 22 sentences of life
imprisonment to members of all services. 64 Some of the more sensational
press stories about atrocities have resulted from evidence introduced at
courts-martials. The fact that individuals
were court-martialed for the offenses
was underplayed in the rush to describe
"current military practices. ,,65
Conclusion. What conclusions can be
drawn from this analysis? First, the legal
realities of the Yamashita case differ
considerably from the public perception. Contrary to references in recent
books and articles, the Yamashita case
did not establish a standard of absolute
command responsibility wherein a commander could be held criminally liable
for the actions of his command even if
he was ignorant of their transgressions
or was unable to influence them. The
Military Commission which tried General Yamashita heard evidence which
directly linked him to the knowledge of
offenses committed by his troops. On
the basis of this evidence, the Commission found Yamashita gUilty of failing
to control his subordinates. The case
represents a reasonable standard of command responsibility which states that a
c·ommander can be held liable for the
actions of his troops if he knows of
them or blatantly ignores them and fails
to take appropriate action.
The Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings provide a clearer example of limited
command responsibility consistent with
this paper's view of the Yamashita case.
The Court in the "High Command case"
was quite explicit in its rationale. The
judgment stated that dereliction must
be personal and knowledge must be
shown in order to convict commanders
for the offenses committed by their
command. In view of the judicious and
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restrained nature of the Nuremberg
trials and the expansive rationale offered by the court, why is it that the
war crimes publicists feel compelled to
apply their version of the Yamashita
case to U_S. conduct in Vietnam? The
teachers and students of international
law need to reconsider such actions.
The war crimes trials examined in
this paper offer a reasonable and fairly
unambiguous standard concerning command responsibility under the international law of war. A commander is
responsible for the actions of his subordinates. He is required to take steps to
prevent war crimes, to halt their continuation when he discovers them, and
to punish the wrongdoers. He would be
found guilty if he knew of crimes
committed by members of his command
or had reaso~ to know of them and
failed to take the requisite action. The
tribunals left unanswered the degree of
efficiency required from the commander in preventing war crimes, in
discovering information about them,
and in punishing wrongdoers. In many
ways, this is the core issue between the

u.s. generals and their accusers concerning Vietnam. The generals probably
wish they had been more efficient in
preventing unlawful actions. The accusers seem to be demanding perfection.
Resolution of this dilemma lies in the
question of "intent."
The Falks and the Sheehans seem to
forget that culpability in war crimes
often hangs on "intent." The legal
defense available to u.s. leaders combined with a genuine demonstrated intent to minimize civilian casualties
provides a defense of such strength that
it strains the imagination of a knowledgeable observer to visualize any senior
U.S. military leader being convicted
under the Nuremberg precedent for U.S.
practices in Vietnam.
Three conclusions emerge. First, the
so-called Yamashita principle does not
exist legally. Second, the Nuremberg
trials established a standard of command responsibility which demands
proof of personal negligence or personal
participation. Third, the U.S. military
actions in Vietnam are backed by a solid
defense of policy, deeds, and intent.
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